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repeated reversals of taxes making the budget procyclical. 
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31. Introduction 
The size of government is the outcome of a political conflict that reflects 
opposing views on the size of government and its means of financing. Budgetary 
outcomes are the consequence of the underlying political structure. A major overhaul of 
spending or the tax system is hard to implement in one electoral term. Governments 
usually decide on additional spending measures or introduce marginal changes to 
existing tax systems. Politicians thereby give in to calls for spending or tax changes 
after election into office, serving the interests of their constituencies. Moreover, 
economic fluctuations also entail responses in the budget in the short-term. Extra 
revenues flow in during an economic upswing. These automatic stabilisers also work on 
the spending side: in recession, unemployment benefits and social transfers start to rise. 
Hence, fiscal policy may switch its stance due to political and economic circumstances. 
Changes in fiscal policy are best understood by relating them to different regimes. 
Portugal has a long record of persistently high and variable fiscal deficits. Since 
1978 it did not exceed the 3% of GDP threshold only in seven years. Indeed, Portugal 
was the first EU country to breach the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 
2002, and to become therefore subject to the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). This 
situation occurred again in 2005 and 2009. To understand the failed attempts at fiscal 
consolidation requires a detailed analysis of budget processing in Portugal. In this 
paper, we apply Markov Switching (MS) techniques to track the time variation in the 
behaviour of fiscal policy. We look at the change in the reaction coefficients of a fiscal 
policy rule in which the government reacts to debt and the cycle. We test period by 
period the changes in the responses, and then relate the shifts in the fiscal regime with 
political and economic variables. We apply this to a new dataset of quarterly fiscal 
series – based on high frequency cash data – for Portugal over the period 1978-2007.
Our main finding is that budgetary problems have been chronic over the period 
1978-2007. A lack of adjustment on the spending side has contributed to debt 
accumulation. Temporary gains from high economic growth and the reduction in debt 
service in the transition to EMU were missed as an opportunity for an overhaul in public 
finances. Erratic changes in tax policy have made fiscal policy procyclical. Economic 
booms have been typically used to relax tax pressure. One-off measures have been 
preferred over structural measures to contain the deficit during economic crises. The 
stricter surveillance of budget deficits under the SGP has only accentuated these 
problems. The EU fiscal rules forced temporary consolidation, but did not structurally 
4change the budget process. The root cause of fiscal trouble is a lack of transparency on 
budget decisions, insufficient budget management, and a lax application of fiscal rules. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section two, we briefly 
review fiscal developments in Portugal and describe the dataset. In section three, we 
derive a fiscal policy rule, and present our Markov Switching methodology to 
characterise the time varying properties of fiscal policy. We interpret the different fiscal 
regimes in section four. We summarise our findings, and give some suggestions for 
fiscal reform in section five. 
2. Fiscal developments in Portugal 
We have built a quarterly dataset for Portugal from high frequency central 
government budget monthly cash data (Afonso and Sousa, 2009). These data are 
disseminated through the publications of the General Accounting Offices, the Ministry 
of Finance and the Bank of Portugal. The latest figures are also published in the IMF 
Special Data Dissemination Standard section. Figure 1 shows that the patterns of the 
cash based data budget series follow very closely the ones based on accrual based 
national accounts data for the general government provided by the European 
Commission (AMECO).1 The main reason is that central government is responsible for 
the bulk of the budget; local government spends just about 10% of the total budget. 
Figure 1 shows the size of government, overall tax revenues and public debt 
since 1980. Fiscal developments in Portugal have to a large extent been determined by 
the integration in the EU and the EMU. Public spending has taken up an ever larger part 
of the economy. The size of government went up from 23.5 per cent of GDP in the 
1970s to 35.8 per cent in the 1990s. Large part of this expansion was a catch up process 
with other EU countries. Recent trends in spending have been less reassuring. Under 
pressure of the Maastricht criteria, EU countries started curbing down public 
expenditure since the mid-1990s. In contrast, primary spending continued to rise and 
reached an average of 42.7 per cent between 2000 and 2008. Government revenues have 
been trending upward over the entire sample, but did not keep pace with the rise in 
government spending. As a consequence, Portugal has a record of persistent fiscal 
deficits since 1978. Only in seven years did the general government budget deficit not 
exceed 3%. As a result of these continued budget deficits, government debt rose quickly 
1 A detailed description is provided in the Appendix. 
5in the early eighties, then stabilised around 60% of GDP, but has drifted upward again 
since 1999. 
Figure 1 – Quarterly versus annual based fiscal data. 
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Note: ---- quarterly data -- AMECO data; all variables are in percentage of GDP, sample period is 1978:1-2007:4. 
Changes in the fiscal stance are also driven by cyclical fluctuations in the short-
term. High economic growth boosts tax revenues and diminishes spending on 
unemployment benefits or social transfers. At high levels of debt, changes in inflation 
and interest rates also have an important impact on debt service. A good summary 
indicator to capture both the long-term trends and the short-term fluctuations in the 
fiscal stance is the debt stabilising surplus. This is the surplus that stabilises government 
debt, and depends on the level of interest rates as well as on economic growth. The 
change over time in debt bt is given by the current primary surplus ts , which is the 
difference between government revenues tt and primary government spending gt, and 
the accumulation of interest payments on past fiscal imbalances. The latter part depends 
6on the difference between the real interest rate rt and real economic growth yt. If we 
express all data as a ratio to GDP, the government budget constraint (1) can be written 
as follows: 
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If economic growth exceeds the additional interest payments, persistent deficits are still 
consistent with the stabilisation of debt: growth suffices to service debt. The debt ratio 
remains stable over time (that is, bt = bt-1) if the surplus equals 
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Figure 2 plots the time path of this debt stabilising surplus ts , together with the 
output gap and the long-term real interest rate. High real interest rates and below 
average economic growth in the early eighties pushed this debt stabilising surplus up to 
15% of GDP. The consequent decline is dominated by the gradual fall in interest rates. 
Since EU membership in 1986, long-term interest rates started to fall. Improved 
sovereign debt ratings further saved on the debt servicing costs. Weak economic growth 
in the first half of the nineties halted the fall in the debt stabilising surplus, which 
hovered around 5% of GDP. As long-term interest rates started to converge to EMU 
levels (by 1999, rates decreased by around 1650 basis points in total) and real economic 
growth received a corresponding boost between 1995 and 1999, the surplus fell further. 
It has been stable around 2% since then and it has been fluctuating much less. 
Figure 2 shows how Portugal became the first country in the EU to breach the 
SGP 3% deficit limit in 2001. The fall in economic growth in 2002 pushed up the debt 
stabilising surplus by nearly 4%. On 5 November 2002, the EU Council ascertained an 
excessive deficit in Portugal and issued a recommendation requesting Portugal to bring 
the deficit back below 3% by 2003 at the latest. An EU Council Decision of 11 May 
2004 abrogated further steps in the EDP as measures taken in 2003 already indeed 
reduced the deficit below 3%. Despite this quick consolidation, the deficit shot above 
the 3% limit again in 2004, and a second EDP was initiated in 2005. The European 
Commission recommended a gradual reduction of the cyclically-adjusted deficit, 
7excluding one-off and other temporary measures, by 1.5% of GDP in 2006, and at least 
0.75% of GDP in the following years. This deadline was extended to 2008. Portugal did 
not adjust the budget in a permanent way, and in October 2009, a new EDP was 
announced, also in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 global economic crises. 
Figure 2 – Debt stabilising primary surplus. 
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83. Methodology 
We summarize the behaviour of fiscal policy with a reaction function that 
describes how a fiscal indicator changes in response to government debt and to the 
business cycle. Assume the government has some long-term target fiscal target *f . It 
moreover decides to adjust this optimal target at time t to keep under control the 
deviation of debt bt from some target level *b . Given the structure of spending and 
taxation, the target will moreover fluctuate in response to expected deviations of output 
ty  from some desired target output level 
y . This output response of the budget 
includes two components. In an economic boom, as output rises above its long-term 
level y , unemployment benefits and transfer payments are reduced or tax receipts rise. 
In addition to these automatic stabilisers, the elasticity of these budget items with 
respect to output captures also includes systematic discretionary interventions of the 
government to steer the economy. The government may wish to lean against an 
economic crisis by cutting taxes or raising expenses. A fiscal reaction function for this 
time varying target surplus tfˆ  can then be written as follows: 
).()(ˆ *   bbyyff ttt 	      (3) 
Given that the budget process is typically characterized by long implementation lags the 
anticipated (endogenous) component of fiscal policy should be adequately represented 
by a simple feedback rule, in which the actual indicator tf  only gradually adjusts to its 
target level: 
.ˆ)1(1 tttt fff 
         (4) 
Substitution of (3) into (4) gives the following non-linear relation between the fiscal 
instrument and public debt, and is the baseline fiscal rule we test: 
.])[1(1 ttttt bxff 
	       (5) 
9In (5), the output gap is given by yyx tt  . The constant term  =
  byyf 	 )(*  can be interpreted as a long-term fiscal indicator: it adjusts the 
target surplus for the deviation between the government’s output target and long-term 
potential output, and for the government debt target. Deviations from the rule, which are 
captured by the residual term t
 , are discretionary changes in systematic fiscal policy.  
We allow now the reaction coefficients in (5) to vary over time. A distinction 
has typically been made between policies that stabilise debt, or do not (Sims, 1994). 
These are either ‘active’ (non-Ricardian) or ‘passive’ (Ricardian) fiscal policies.2
Suppose that the fiscal instrument tf  is the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio ts . We 
moreover follow Favero and Monacelli (2005) and substitute debt tb  for the debt 
stabilizing surplus ts  in (5). This non-linear fiscal rule implicitly controls for the time-
varying effects of interest rates and growth on the debt service component of the deficit 
that are not under direct control of the government itself. In this case, fiscal policy is 
passive when the coefficient associated to the debt stabilising surplus ts  is not 
statistically different from one. In addition, the constant term   should not be 
statistically different from zero. A non-zero surplus would imply trend growth in debt. 
In contrast, fiscal policy is active if 0  and 0 . We therefore assume that the 
reaction coefficients in (5) can change between two different states.  
The debt response comes in addition to the systematic cyclical response of fiscal 
policy.3 If automatic stabilisers are let to work, then 	  is identical to the cyclical 
elasticity of the budget; the structural surplus is constant at its long-term level ceteris 
paribus. Typically, this elasticity is around 0.50 for OECD countries, but slightly 
smaller in Portugal (0.46, according to Girouard and André (2005)). If 	  is smaller than 
this elasticity, the surplus is procyclical. 
We estimate the fiscal policy rule with a Markov Switching (MS) model in 
which the probability of each different regime – indicated by the state tm  – of fiscal 
policy can vary endogenously over time.4
                                                
2 Note that a passive rule is not uniquely defined from the data generating process for surpluses and debt, and is 
observationally equivalent to an off-equilibrium behaviour that is consistent with active fiscal policies (Cochrane, 
1998).
3 We take as an output measure the HP filtered output gap. 
4 There are a few examples in the literature of regime switching tests of fiscal behaviour on US data. Davig (2004) 
examines the time varying probability of high and low debt regimes; Favero and Monacelli (2005) test a fiscal rule 
similar to (6). EU studies are fewer: Thams (2006) estimates fiscal rules for Germany and Spain; Claeys (2008) does 
so for Sweden. 
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In contrast to papers that test only the change in the debt response, or the symmetry of 
the cyclical response, we test for stochastic changes over time in all coefficients of (6). 
Additionally, we allow the variance of the shocks to switch between regimes. We 
estimate the MS model of the fiscal rule by maximum likelihood, using the Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm. There is no objective criterion to select the optimal 
number of regimes over which the coefficients can switch. Given the possibly two-sided 
responses in debt and output, there are potentially four different regimes. We start by 
imposing two regimes, and check the results for a higher number of states.5
4. Empirical results 
4.1. The fiscal policy rule 
Let us first look at the change in the parameters when the regime generating 
process is a two-state Markov chain. Table 1 reports the coefficient estimates of the 
fiscal rule (6) under regime 1 or 2. We accordingly classify fiscal policy as ‘active’ or 
‘passive’. We also provide some additional statistics for each regime, such as the 
residual variance 2 , the mean surplus and debt ratio, the number of observations and 
average duration of each regime. Finally, we calculate also the transition probabilities pij
between both states i and j. Figure 3 plots the primary surplus ratio, and indicates with 
bars the probability of a given regime occurring in each quarter. The smooth and dashed 
lines show the predicted and smoothed probability of each regime in a given year. These 
probabilities are either based on the estimates up to that quarter, or on those of the entire 
sample. 
Table 1 – Regimes in the fiscal rule (6), MS model, 2 regimes. 
label   	  2
mean 
debt
mean 
surplus
# obs duration p11 p22
regime 1 active -0.58** -7.57** 0.02 0.01** 2.26 53.20 -6.87 30.00 30.94 0.97 0.03 
regime 2 active 0.22* -2.78** -0.44 0.31* 2.73 63.23 -3.12 81.00 30.10 0.01 0.99 
Note: pij is the transition probability from regime i to j; *, ** – significance at 5 and 1 %. 
                                                
5 All computations are done in MSVAR for Ox (Krolzig, 1998). 
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Figure 3 – Regimes in the fiscal rule, MS model, 2 regimes. 
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Figure 3 indicates a once and for all shift in 1988. The main reason for this 
change is the jump in the average surplus from -6.9% to -3.1% over the two periods. 
This turning point is much less outspoken for the other reaction coefficients: an active 
and acyclical policy becomes only slightly more passive and countercyclical after 1988 
(Table 1). This change is not significant: fiscal policy continues to be unsustainable, so 
we can classify both periods as ‘active’ regimes. Without exception, other studies also 
confirm that government debt is on a non-sustainable path in Portugal (Afonso, 2005; 
Marinheiro, 2006; Guichard and Leibfritz, 2006). 
A test of the fiscal rule under three different regimes refines our understanding 
of the change in fiscal policy (Table 2, Figure 4). Before 1988 (regime 1), deficits are 
high and the lack of a debt response still coincides with a lack of a cyclical response of 
the primary surplus. The period after 1988 can be split up into two distinct regimes. 
There are now relevant switches between active and passive policies. Under regime 2, 
the surplus is set to correct deviations in debt, while in regime 3, it is not. From Figure 
4, it is not immediately clear whether the fiscal rules of the Maastricht Treaty and the 
SGP have had a strong impact. Fiscal policy seems to have become more virtuous in 
preparation of EMU, and since the first EDP was started in 2002. But fiscal discipline 
has been hard to maintain, and fiscal consolidation was easily abandoned for a more 
relaxed stance. We can observe how quickly efforts to consolidate taper off once EMU 
12
membership was acquired in 1998. There is indeed little evidence that EU rules 
profoundly changed fiscal decisions in Portugal, or in other EU countries. Galí and 
Perotti (2003) or Balassone et al. (2008) test fiscal rules similar to ours and fail to find a 
structural break in 1992. Balassone and Francese (2004) do find a slightly stronger 
response to debt over time. We also see this gradual adjustment happening in Portugal, 
but it is not continued. Bayar and Smeets (2009) follow a very similar methodology as 
we do. They compute the transition probability of budget deficit over the cycle, and 
show that budget rules – like the 3% limit in the SGP – seem to be more easily violated 
in Portugal than in other EU countries. Our findings for the most recent years confirm 
this.
Table 2 – Regimes in the fiscal rule, MS model, 3 regimes 
label   	  2
mean 
debt
mean 
surplus
# obs duration p11 p22 p33
regime 1 active -0.58** -7.54** 0.02 0.01** 2.27 53 7.11 29.40 30.32 0.97 0.03 0.00 
regime 2 passive -0.24* -5.41** -1.15** 0.58 2.05 65 3.46 41.80 8.89 0.00 0.89 0.11 
regime 3 active 0.05 -1.23* -0.09 0.36** 1.92 62 2.69 39.80 10.48 0.00 0.10 0.90 
Note: pij is the transition probability from regime i to j; *, ** –significance at 5 and 1 %. 
Figure 4 – Regimes in the fiscal rule, MS model, 3 regimes. 
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The other main finding is that the switch in the debt response coincides with a 
change in the cyclical stance. The budget is procyclical – with a cyclical elasticity of the 
budget is -1.15 – when it is consolidating, while in the other regime it is merely -0.09. 
For example, in an economic crisis, the government cuts spending and raises taxes. As 
fiscal policy seems to have Keynesian effects in Portugal (Afonso and Sousa, 2009), 
this result implies that the government stabilises debt at the expense of a further 
destabilisation of the economy. Instead, under the other regime, fiscal policy does not 
magnify output fluctuations but does not take measures to stabilise debt either: There is 
substantial evidence that many EU governments frequently take discretionary measures 
that overturn the workings of automatic stabilisers (EC, 2001). 
What explains the changes over time between policies that are active and 
acyclical, and periods in which policy becomes passive and procyclical? According to 
the ‘tax smoothing’ hypothesis, tax rates should be held constant over the business cycle 
and the budget deficit should move in a countercyclical fashion, for a given path of 
government spending. Keynesian models would also suggest adjusting taxes and 
spending in a countercyclical fashion to smooth the cycle. Procyclical policies 
exacerbate economic instability as the distortionary effect of taxation becomes larger, 
and consequently stifle growth. This may actually explain a large part of 
macroeconomic instability in Portugal.6 Table 3 shows that the volatility of GDP in 
Portugal, measured by the standard deviation of the real GDP growth rate, is on the high 
end for EU countries7
Table 3 – Output volatility in the EU (1970-2007). 
Germany 1.16 Italy 1.85
France 1.38 UK 1.89
Netherlands 1.52 Spain 1.97
Austria 1.61 Finland 2.70
Belgium 1.71 Ireland 2.77
Sweden 1.75 Portugal 3.08
Denmark 1.84 Greece 3.22
Note: standard deviation of real GDP growth. 
                                                
6 Afonso and Claeys (2008) show that fiscal policy indeed contributes much more to the variance in output 
developments in Portugal than in other EU countries. 
7 Note that if we do not allow for a change in volatility, the estimated coefficients of the AR model are not stable and 
the switches are randomly distributed over the sample period. 
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4.2. Procyclical policy changes and electoral cycles 
There are several theories giving a rationale as to why policymakers favour 
using suboptimal procyclical policies. The leading theory is that governments are cut off 
from credit lines when an economic crisis hits. Without additional bond or tax 
financing, governments have no choice but to cut spending as tax revenues falter. This 
starving of public expenditure is a recurrent phenomenon in developing economies 
(Gavin and Perotti, 1997). For an OECD country like Portugal, it is unlikely that credit 
markets restrict financing. Capital markets have continued to buy Portuguese 
government bonds in the past. The declining long-term government bond interest rates, 
with limited spreads vis-à-vis the German benchmark, are further proof of the continued 
financing of budget deficits. Despite recent downward revisions, sovereign debt ratings 
have continued to be high (Table 4). 
Table 4 – Long-term sovereign debt credit ratings. 
  Fitch S&P Moody’s 
foreign
currency 
local 
currency outlook
foreign
currency 
local 
currency outlook
foreign
currency 
local 
currency outlook
1990    A  positive A1    
1995 AA- AAA  AA- AAA stable A1    
2000 AA AA stable AA AA stable Aa2 Aa2 stable 
2005 AA AA negative AA- AA- stable Aa2 Aa2 stable 
2007 AA AA negative AA- AA- stable Aa2 Aa2 stable 
2009 AA AA negative A+ A+ negative Aa2 Aa2 stable 
Source: Rating agencies. 
Financial markets take the decision to continue financing fiscal imbalances by 
considering some fiscal indicator of sustainability. Large swings in this measure might 
indicate recurrent financing problems. We estimate an AR(4) model for the debt 
stabilising surplus, and allow the mean and variance to shift between two latent states.8
Results of this MS model do not show large swings, but a gradual shift – starting in 
1995, and completed by 1998 – from a period of low and volatile, to a regime of higher 
and less rapidly changing surpluses.9 Past fiscal procyclicality cannot be due to some 
market disciplining corrections during downturns. 
Other theories see procyclical policies as the outcome of a political distortion in 
the budget process. The basic tenet of these models is that fiscal surpluses – in 
economic booms – will generate political pressures for additional public spending or tax 
                                                
8 Results not reported, but available on request. 
9 As in Davig (2004), we also estimate an AR(4) model for the debt ratio. As debt is a non-stationary series, the 
regime estimates are not stable. This confirms our previous finding that fiscal policy is active. 
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cuts. Talvi and Vegh (2005) present a model in which a fiscal surplus raises lobbying 
efforts for higher public spending. A benevolent social planner can limit this spending 
bias by cutting taxes during the boom. This undermines the financing base for 
additional spending. Moreover, fiscal policy is not only expansionary in good times, but 
also contractionary in bad times. The government raises taxes in crises to avoid 
accumulating debt. The optimal policy is procyclical over the entire cycle. The larger 
are economic fluctuations – and hence changes in the tax base – the more procyclical is 
fiscal policy.10
Two different – but not mutually exclusive – political theories explain the 
distortion at the root of the increased lobbying efforts in booms. On the one hand, Lane 
and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999) argue that multiple power blocs 
(ministries, lobby groups, etc.) compete for a bigger share in spending. On the other 
hand, Alesina et al. (2008) assume that voters have imperfect information on the budget 
process. In order to avoid that corrupt governments distribute tax revenues to particular 
interest groups, voters anticipate this, and appropriate part of the additional tax revenues 
in economic booms by voting for increases in their preferred public good, or a tax cut. 
This forces the government to a procyclical bias in taxation. As fiscal revenues increase 
in an economic boom, more resources are available, and this increases the level of 
competition. Spending may even grow more than proportionally relative to the increase 
in income. The same argument for the excess rise in spending can also lead to a 
disproportionate fall in taxation: if interest groups call for tax reductions for their 
constituency, the political distortion could also induce too low taxation in booms. 
Empirical studies find evidence for political cycles in the surplus on a panel of 
EU countries (Golinelli and Momigliano, 2006; Hallerberg and Strauch, 2003). For 
Portugal, we overlay in Figure 5 the debt stabilizing surplus with the three regime MS-
estimates of the fiscal surplus rule obtained before. The vertical lines indicate the 
quarter in which parliamentary elections took place. The Portuguese electoral system 
favours one party majority, and we indicate the governing party (PS ‘Socialist Party’ or 
PSD ‘Social Democratic Party’) for every term. These election periods indeed coincide 
with shifts from a procyclical passive to an acyclical active policy. The reasons for the 
change are less obvious. It occurs when power is handed over, but also when the 
governing party remains in charge. In addition, at the time of the switch, the surplus 
may either fall or rise. 
                                                
10 This model takes large fluctuations in tax bases as exogenous. 
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Figure 5 – Elections and regimes in the fiscal rule.
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4.3. Procyclical fiscal policies 
Changes in the policy stance follow from a combination of time varying 
spending and tax policies. We now expand the evidence on the fiscal rule, and test 
changes in the response of government spending over time. The government decides on 
primary spending in response to the cycle and the debt stabilising surplus. We assume 
again a two state Markov chain for the evolution of the latent process. If spending is the 
left hand side variable, the fiscal regime is active (passive) if 0  ( 0 ) in equation 
(6). We allow for trend growth in spending or taxes. Hence, we drop the restriction of 
the constant term  being equal to zero. The cyclical variability in spending should be 
relatively minor. Computations of budget elasticities by the OECD assume that only 
unemployment benefits vary over the cycle. Other budget components are assumed to 
be cyclically insensitive. Girouard and André (2005) find an overall spending elasticity 
of -0.05. A countercyclical spending policy would imply a significantly smaller 
elasticity. 
For tax revenues, we can similarly specify a fiscal rule, and test the time varying 
responses. If tax revenue is the left hand side variable, the fiscal regime is active 
(passive) if 0  ( 0 ) in equation (6). The output elasticity of government revenues 
is based on the properties of each tax item (viz. social security contributions, corporate, 
personal and indirect taxes) and the elasticity of the tax bases to output. OECD figures 
GDP%
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put this number at 0.47 for overall revenues (Girouard and André, 2005). Significantly 
smaller numbers indicate a procyclical tax policy. 
The results reported in Table 5 reveal that spending is the main thrust behind the 
debt bias. We find that both regimes are active: fiscal consolidation on the spending side 
has never taken place. This continued growth of primary spending casts doubt on long-
term fiscal sustainability. The pace of spending growth has nonetheless slowed down 
since about the introduction of the Maastricht rules. But this break is not substantial, 
and there are several episodes in which spending shoots up quickly again (1997 and 
2005). Figure 6 plots the spending ratio, together with the election dates and the two 
regimes. Large rises in spending do not usually occur just before or after elections. They 
do coincide with shifts to a less sustainable policy in the most recent episodes (1997 and 
2005). This political cycle has become weaker since the late nineties. Spending has 
stabilised at an unsustainable level, albeit with a continued weak response to the cycle. 
Table 5 – Regimes in the primary spending rule, MS model, 2 regimes. 
label  	  2
mean 
debt
mean 
spending 
mean 
surplus
# obs duration p11 p22
regime 1 active 41.47** 0.02 0.07** 1.79 59 36 2.82 66.40 23.46 0.96 0.04 
regime 2 active 47.55** -0.34 0.01** 3.07 63 37 6.42 44.60 15.51 0.06 0.94 
Note: pij transition probability from regime i to j; *, ** – significance at 5 and 1 %. 
Figure 6 – Regimes in the primary spending rule, MS model, 2 regimes. 
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Our findings regarding the surplus rule in Table 1 say that fiscal policy becomes 
slightly more sustainable over time. Given the drift in public spending, public finances 
must thus be consolidated with tax increases. However, there is not much evidence of 
switches in the parameters of the tax rule (Table 6). Although we observe a gradual rise 
in tax revenues over time, this shift has not been strong enough to make tax policy 
passive. According to Bronchi and Santos-Gomes (2001), the 1989 tax reform that 
broadened the tax base and introduced statutory tax rates did not contribute much to 
consolidation and this is also featured in our analysis (Figure 7). Only since about 1994, 
and under the influence of the Maastricht rules, did tax policies become more 
responsive to government debt. Nonetheless, this type of tax policy has not been 
maintained permanently. In fact, taxes responded much less to debt in 1997 and over the 
period 2003-2005. 
Table 6 – Regimes in the tax rule, MS model, 2 regimes. 
label  	  2
mean 
debt
mean 
revenue 
mean 
surplus # obs duration p11 p22
regime 1 active 31.91** -0.36* -0.20 2.19 57 30 6.02 46.30 14.01 0.93 0.07 
regime 2 active 34.84** -0.28* 0.03 1.18 63 35 2.89 64.70 26.36 0.04 0.96 
Note: pij is the transition probability from regime i to j; *, ** –significance at 5 and 1 %. 
Figure 7 – Regimes in the tax rule, MS model, 2 regimes. 
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Surprisingly, tax policy has been procyclical under both regimes. This is in 
contrast to other studies that usually argue that a procyclical surplus is due to 
government spending (Lane, 2003). Even though taxation is procyclical over the entire 
sample, the government budget happens to be procyclical in three specific periods only: 
the late eighties, around 1995, and in the period 2002-2005. In those years, the cyclical 
responses of the budget via automatic stabilisers were offset by discretionary tax 
measures. An economic boom at the end of the eighties did not seem to be used for 
structural consolidation. The 1986 episode has had more features of an adjustment on 
the spending side. Government debt fell as economic growth rose, but little else was 
done to bring down the deficit. Despite the introduction of VAT, tax revenues did not 
raise much. The two other periods are marked by economic slumps. The consolidation 
episode of 1992 was mainly focused on tax increases. The 1993 economic downturn in 
Europe reduced tax income, and primary spending rose significantly too that year. The 
government used privatisation revenues amounting to 2 per cent of GDP for debt 
redemption. The economic boom of the mid nineties was foregone as a moment to 
implement structural adjustment. The economic decline starting in 2001 put again under 
strain the budget. The government resorted once more to temporary measures to control 
the deficit. In 2002, the government granted a tax amnesty; in 2003, tax credits were 
securitized. This consolidation strategy also included an increase in the standard VAT 
rate from 17 to 19 per cent, which was further raised to 21 per cent in July 2005. These 
temporary measures added up to 6.2 per cent of GDP over the period 2002-2005. 
The increase in tax revenues during economic crisis avoided a further worsening 
of the budget deficit, but did not address the structural factors behind the underlying 
fiscal imbalances. Due to a lack of structural measures in good economic times, surging 
deficits urged consolidation in economic crisis. Consolidation has been temporary and 
aimed at reducing the budget deficit in the short-run (Guichard and Leibfritz, 2006). 
Such focus on tax based consolidations with yearly switches in tax policy has 
undermined the success of fiscal consolidations (Pina, 2004). 
4.4. Cyclical asymmetry in the budget, and debt accumulation 
The patterns that we uncovered in spending and tax policy closely follow the 
predictions of the Talvi and Vegh (2005) model: taxes are insufficiently raised to 
finance higher spending, and taxation is increased only if mounting imbalances urge a 
fiscal adjustment. However, models of procyclical policy cannot explain the debt bias in 
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fiscal policy. Procyclical policies deliberately create deficits in economic booms, and 
follow a more restrictive stance in economic crisis. As a consequence, they stabilise the 
deficit. A debt bias can only occur if deficits in a crisis are not offset by sufficiently 
large surpluses in economic booms. 
From the estimation of the surplus rule, we have evidence that the change in the 
debt response of the budget is associated with the cyclical response (Table 2, Figure 4). 
The failure to take tax measures in good economic times becomes even clearer if we 
look at some additional evidence on the asymmetric reaction of the budget to positive 
and negative cyclical conditions. We estimate the fiscal rules on the full sample, but test 
if the response to positive or negative output gaps differs. The results are summarized in 
Table 7, and show that fiscal policy indeed reacts asymmetrically to cyclical conditions. 
An upturn is accompanied by a strong deterioration of the overall budget (elasticity of -
0.94) while a downturn does not worsen the balance significantly. Taxes are cut in 
economic booms, with overall revenues falling despite the increase in the tax bases. 
Moreover, taxes are not raised back in a crisis to a similar extent.11 Government 
spending does not respond to the changes in the cycle, neither in a boom nor during a 
recession. 
Table 7 – Fiscal rule, full sample, positive versus negative output gap. 
 	 	 
surplus rule -1.34*** -0.94** 0.78 -0.08 
spending rule 41.35*** 0.26 -0.38 0.50** 
tax rule 34.98*** -0.80** 0.29 -0.16 
Note:	+, 	-– responses to positive and negative output gaps. 
Budget decisions in other EU countries are taken in a similar procyclical way. 
There is ample evidence of a fiscal relaxation in good times that is not offset by a 
tightening in downturn.12 Governments loosen the fiscal stance by the size of the 
additional tax revenues in good times, but let the balance deteriorate as soon as 
economic conditions start to worsen (Manasse, 2006; Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2008).13
But the results for Portugal are even stronger than what is typically found for other EU 
                                                
11 This is further evidence that procyclical policies are not due to falling credit ratings. 
12 See the studies by Buti and Sapir (1998), Buti et al. (1998), EC (2001), Von Hagen et al. (2002), and Balassone et 
al. (2008). 
13 Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) argue that the findings of asymmetric procylical policies depend on the way 
fiscal policy is modelled. Using real time data to test fiscal rules, they find that governments genuinely react in a 
countercyclical and symmetric way to the cycle. 
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countries. First, in Portugal, the budget surplus actually falls in economic booms, while 
it rises – albeit insignificantly – in economic crises. Discretionary measures have not 
just undermined automatic stabilisers, but have overturned them. Second, for most EU 
countries, this asymmetry is due to buoyant spending in economic booms (Balassone et
al., 2008). For instance, Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) show that in other OECD 
countries spending goes up during booms, but it does not come down in recessions. In 
contrast, this growth dividend has been used for cutting taxes while keeping the surplus 
in check in Portugal. Tax reductions can be financed while the government is not seen 
as irresponsible with public finances. 
The results in Table 7 also confirm that fiscal policy is not sustainable. The 
insignificant response of the surplus to the rise in debt is a combination of continued 
spending and less responsive tax revenues. As in other EU countries, debt accumulates 
if fiscal policy refrains from taking similarly sized contractionary measures in the 
downside part of the cycle. We indeed find no evidence of spending cuts in crises while 
tax increases are rather moderate in bad times.  
The asymmetry in the cyclical response can be explained in three different ways. 
First, interest groups can be so voracious that tough lobbying in booms can create 
excessive borrowing. Therefore, tax cuts or spending hikes may be more than 
proportional to GDP growth. Second, the intensity of lobbying is likely to decrease in 
recessions. Lobbying groups or uninformed tax payers compete less on (or try to avoid) 
spending cutbacks or tax rises in a recession. Finally, political opportunism may interact 
with the mounting pressures in economic booms. Governments may lower taxes in a 
boom and seemingly maintain the deficit in check. The impact on the deficit (and debt) 
becomes clear only in the next recession. Politicians can do so strategically to constrain 
successor governments (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990) or to raise the probability of re-
election now (Aghion and Bolton, 1990). 
4.5. Power dispersion and budget fragmentation: an interpretation 
What could explain the reluctance to raise taxes in economic booms? One 
prediction of the models of procyclical policy is that volatile economic cycles 
exacerbate the policy distortions. In countries with volatile output, different pressure 
groups repeatedly compete over a fluctuating level of resources. Tax cuts or spending 
hikes may then be more than proportional to GDP growth. As we showed in Table 3, 
the volatility of output in Portugal is among the highest in the OECD. However, given 
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that procyclical policies worsen the economic distortions of taxation, it is likely that a 
large part of the fluctuations in GDP is due to fiscal policy itself.  
The voracity model of procyclical policy argues that the common pool problem 
– on spending or taxation – is more severe when power is diffused among a larger 
number of agents. Different interest groups lobby more intensively for a higher share. 
Henisz (2000) constructs an index of power dispersion that counts the number of veto 
points in the political system and the distribution of preferences across and within the 
different branches of the government. Table 8 compares this index for EU countries, 
and we see that although competition among political groups exists in Portugal, it is not 
stronger than in other EU countries.
Table 8 – Power dispersion in EU countries. 
Germany 0.85 Italy 0.75 
France 0.74 UK 0.74 
Netherlands 0.73 Spain 0.75 
Austria 0.74 Finland 0.77 
Belgium 0.89 Ireland 0.75 
Sweden 0.77 Portugal 0.75 
Denmark 0.77 Greece 0.38 
Source: Henisz (2000). 
Procyclicality also occurs when the budget process is not very transparent. 
Voters might pressure governments to reduce taxation if they have little information on 
the way public spending is distributed (Alesina et al., 2008). Several OECD reports 
point to shortcomings in the budget management process in Portugal and in the planning 
and control of public spending (Bronchi, 2003). There have also been data limitations in 
the past that prevented accurate monitoring of the outcomes of public finances.14 In 
recent years, several steps have been taken to control these loopholes in budget making 
(Curristine et al., 2008). 
There is some evidence that in Portugal, the budget process is also particularly 
complex and fragmented. Table 9 reports a number of indicators of budgeting 
procedures, collected by the OECD (1995), Hallerberg and Von Hagen (1997) and 
                                                
14 For example, a specific commission – under the aegis of the central bank – was created in 2002 to determine the 
size of the 2001 budget deficit. The revised number showed a much higher deficit than previously reported, and 
triggered the first EDP. A similar revision in 2005 doubled the initial deficit, and set off the second EDP. 
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Perotti and Kontopolous (2002). These indicators look at the existence of a spending 
target, who decides on this target, and the way budget negotiations among government 
members take place. In Portugal, decision making on the budget of the central 
government seems quite lax and complicated compared to other EU countries. There is 
no overall spending target that serves as a cap on the budgeting decisions. No legislated 
quantitative limits or procedural rule on the budget exists in Portugal, except for the 
limits set by the SGP.15 Moreover, negotiations on the budget take place between all 
cabinet members, which strengthens the position of different ministries vis-à-vis the 
minister of finance. Of all EU countries, Portugal ranks worst – together with Greece – 
if we look at the sum of all indicators. A similar indication is given by the synthetic 
index of strength of fiscal rules in EU countries that is calculated by the EC (2006). This 
index places Portugal at the bottom end of the indicator.  
Table 9 – Fragmentation of the budget process. 
 Spending target Spending target Spending Negotiation Sum 
0 if determined by 
Finance Minister; 1 
if cabinet decides; 
2 if no target 
1 if no spending 
target (OECD, 
1995)
1 if no spending 
target (Hallerberg 
and Von Hagen, 
1997)
1 if multilateral 
negotiation 
between 
government
members 
Germany 0 0 1/0 0 1 
France 2 1 1 0 4 
Netherlands 1 0 0 0 1 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 2 1 1 0 4 
Sweden 2 1 1 0 4 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 2 1 1 0 4 
UK 1 0 1 0 2 
Spain 2 1 1 0 4 
Finland 2 1 0 0 4 
Ireland 1 0 0 0 1 
Portugal 2 1 1 1 5 
Greece 2 1 1 1 5 
Source: Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002). 
5. Conclusion 
Using a new dataset of quarterly fiscal series drawing on high frequency cash 
data, we apply Markov Switching techniques to track the developments in fiscal policy 
in Portugal over the period 1978-2007. Our main finding is that the behaviour of fiscal 
policy has hardly become more stable or sustainable. Improvements in budgetary 
                                                
15 Manasse (2006) finds that fiscal rules tend to reduce procyclicality if the overall quality of budget institutions is 
low.
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positions are essentially linked to low real interest rates and high economic growth, 
which eased the application of the Maastricht rules in the nineties, but hardly to 
structural measures. 
Repeated reversals of tax policy have made fiscal policy procyclical. Economic 
booms are used to relax tax pressures, often for electoral purposes. These measures are 
only partially undone in the next economic crisis to contain mounting deficits. These 
sudden changes in the policy stance have also been harmful to economic stability. In 
addition, a lax control on spending has contributed to the rise in debt. The constraints 
imposed by the Maastricht criteria and by the SGP have contained deficits but at the 
same time accentuated these budgeting problems. 
We argue that uncontrolled and non-transparent decisions on fiscal adjustment 
are the root of the problem with fiscal policy. One-off measures have often been 
preferred over structural measures to contain the deficit during economic crises. The 
chronic weak control of government spending, combined with an imprecise monitoring 
of the implementation of the budget have worsened this situation. Voters that can only 
imperfectly control the government budget likely prefer tax cuts in economic booms to 
keep at bay additional spending (Alesina et al., 2008).
Portugal has faced difficulties since 2002 in implementing fiscal consolidations. 
At the same time, such difficulties create an opportunity to introduce structural reform 
measures. An overhaul reform of budget procedures – such as the introduction of fiscal 
rules – and a stricter surveillance of the budget will not only save public finance in the 
long-term, but also benefit economic stability in the short-term. Some headway in this 
direction has been made already (Curristine et al., 2008). 
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Appendix – Data description and sources 
GDP
data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, period: 1978:1-2007:4. Source: Bank of 
Portugal.
Deflator 
all variables were deflated by the GDP deflator (2000=100). Data are quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted, period: 1978:1-2007:4. Source: Bank of Portugal. 
Government Spending 
defined as Central Government primary spending (on a cash basis), i.e. the difference 
between authorized expenditure and debt interest payments. We seasonally adjust 
quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, period 1978:1-2007:4. Source: Bank of 
Portugal.
Government Revenue 
defined as Central Government total revenue (on a cash basis). We seasonally adjust 
quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA. period 1978:1-2007:4. Source: Bank of 
Portugal.
Debt 
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is defined as the stock of Direct State Debt. The original series are available as follows:  
1. for the period 1997:12-1994:6, on a quarterly basis: 
a) total internal debt 
b) internal direct debt 
c) total external debt 
d) direct external debt 
e) total public debt 
f) effective public debt 
2. for the periods 1991:12, 1992:12, and 1993:6-1995:11, on a monthly basis: 
a) internal effective direct debt 
b) total effective direct debt 
3. for the period 1995:7-1998:12, on a monthly basis: 
a) internal direct debt 
b) total direct debt 
4. for the period 1998:12-2008:4, on a monthly basis: 
a) direct state debt 
Source: Bank of Portugal, the Directorate-General of Treasury, and the Directorate-
General of Public Credit. 
We build the series for the Direct State Debt as follows: 
1) for 1998:12-2008:4, as the series of direct state debt itself; 
2) for 1995:7-1997:12, we use the ratio of direct state debt to total state debt in 
1998:12 to back-out the series of direct state debt; 
3) for 1993:6-1995:6, we use the ratio of total effective direct state debt to total 
direct state debt in the period 1995:7-1995:11 to get the series of total direct 
debt;
4) for 1977:12-1993:3, we use the ratio of (effective public debt minus non-direct 
debt) to total effective direct debt in the period 1993:6-1994:6 to back-out the 
series of total effective direct debt. 
Given that the scale factors are very close to one, the time series of the Direct State Debt 
is smooth over time and we guarantee that there are not structural breaks. We build the 
quarterly series using monthly data (where available) and seasonally adjust it using 
Census X12 ARIMA. The constructed series comprise the period 1977:4-2007:4. 
